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Summary  findings
The formerly vcommunist  countries in Eastern Europe  Wh .t makes reform so difficult is that too many
and Central Asia (EECA) are undertaking their second  people have already retired. Especially during tht
great social experiment of the century: the transition  transition, when there are few opportunities  to acquire
from authoritarian  central planning to a market  wealth and some intergencrational redistribution  is
economy. One of the rnany problems they face during  needed  the retirees need a safety net, whether  or not
the transition is what to do with their  pension systems.  they desern  e one on the basis of age alone. Fox's
Their problems are more complex than  countries  recommendations  are designed to make the systenm  more
elsewhere at the same income level for three reasons.  equitable and efficient for this group.
First, the systems are mature, with high and sharply  Four years after the fall of the  Berlin Wall, pension
rising dependency ratios. lecond,  pension coverage is  reform has been eluisive  in EECA despite the severity of
more extensive than in most other middle-income  the problem. Fox identifies several reasons for this. First
countries, because of overindustrialization and the  the extent of the pension  -ystem  crisis was not foreseen
collectivization of agriculture. Third, pension refornm  is  in the early days of the transition (except perhaps in
being undertaken  at the same time as other fundainental  Hungary). Indeed, some countries expanded entitlement
economic changes. The timing, sequence, and political  to help induce the labor market to adjust. As the depth of
economy of pension reform are complex.  the problem became clear, EECA countries have tried to
Fox reviews the main feature of existing EECA  formulate reform programs, but only Albania has passed
pension systems, identifies the major reform issues and  legislation substantially reducing entitlements,
reform options, discusses obstacles to reform, and  Another reason reform has proved difficult in EECA
proposes a sequence for reform. She focuses primarily on  countries is that governments have tried-to  reduce the
the richer, older European countries of the EECA,  where  s tupe of the public pillar without providing an
pension systems have matured.  alternative to assure old-age security. Failure to begin
Paradoxically, pensions are low in those countries, yet  dcveloping other pillars (based on savings ar'l  insurance
expenditures as a proportion  of CDP are high. The main  principles) to meet the active generation's  needs for old-
reason for this is the very low age of retirement, which  age securitv may have d-  )omed refo(rm efforts froni the
mcans a short contribution  period and a high  start.
dependency ratio. EECA governments must bring
spending promises in line with a more realistic revenue
ceiling.
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Formerly  communist  countries  in Eastern Europe  and Central Asia (EECA) are
undertaking  their second great social experiment  in this century.'  Following  the failure of
the first experiment (authoritarian  central planning),  these colintries  have begun a rapid
transition to a market economy.  In many countries the pace of change is staggering  -- at
lteast  as revolutionary  as the introduction  of the command economy  itself.  Not only are new
economic  institutions  such as private financial  intermediaries  and unemployment  offices being
created  overnight, bu; the collapse  of the Warsaw  Pact and the authoritarian  regimes required
the creation of new political institutions  as well.  As with the introduction  of the command
economy, the dismantling  and transformation  of the state on this scale is unchatted  territory.
The first years of the transition  have not been easy.  fhe late 1980s had been periods
of declining growth for all EECA countries,  as the inefficiencies  of central  planning, the
limits to growth led by cheap energy, and (especially  in the Soviet Union) the burden of high
military expenditures  took its toll.  However,  the dramatic fall in GDP most countries  have
experienced  since beginning  the transition  was unexpected. As a result of the collapse  of
trading relationships  internally  and externally,  the dislocation  caused by the distribution  of
state a3sets such as land and housing to private owners, the cost of re-tooling  economies
highly dependent  on cheap energy, the toll taken by civil wars and disruptions  in the region,
and the general chaos caused by the pace of change, GDP has fallen 20 to 40 percer  ui
EECA countries since 1989. Chronic inflation has also emerged as price controls ha  . been
removed. While prospects for the restoration  of growth are good in some of the early
reformers,  (e.g. Poland and Hungary),  most EECA countries face bleak prospects over the
medium  term, without hope of restoring  pre-transition  income levels until the beginning  of the
next century.
A major issue facing EECA countries is what to do with their pension systems during
the transition and beyond. As in other developing  countries,  declining growth has resulted in
a fiscal crisis, squeezing  all govemment  expenditures  including transfers. While the EECA
pension problem appears similar to the ones described  for countries at the income level of
EECA in Latin America, the Middle East or North Africa, the problems are actually more
difficult for three reasons.  First, as a result of steadily  declining  fertility and mortality  since
World War II (at least in the European  countries  of EECA),  the systems are mature,  with high
and sharply rising system dependency  ratios.  Eastern European  countries have the
demographic  ratios of their Western  European counterparts  (as well as the aspirations),  but
not the economic  development. Second,  coverage is much more extensive than in most other
middle ir,come  countries (owing  to the over-industrialization  and the collectivization  of
agriculture),  and thus reforrn affects the current and future income stream of many more
households. Third, pension system reforms reed to be undertaken  while many other changes
are going on in the economy, and while income distribution  is changing  dramatically. As a
result, the design of pension reform, including  timing and sequencing  is quite complicated.
And the political  economy of reform is even more challenging.
I  Throughout  this chapter,  the  acronym  EECA  will  be used  to refer  to all the formerly  communist  or
socialist countries  of Europe and Central Asia, including  the former Soviet Union (FSU),  the former members  of
the Warsaw Pact, Albania and the former Yugoslavia.-2-
This paper discusses  pension  system  reform  in the transitioning  economies  of the
EECA. It is divided  into two parts. In the first part, the main features  of the current
syste! i are reviewed,  and the major  reform  issues  highlighted. In the second  part, reform
options,  tailored  to the needs  of the transition  economies,  are presented. Part II concludes
with a discussion  of reform  obstacles,  and a proposed  reform sequencing.  The focus  is
primarily  on the European  countries  of EECA,  as the difficulties  are most  intense  in these
countrie, where  systems  have  matured. The experience  of the richer  and older  European
countries  in transition  offers  important  lessons  for the younger  and poorer  Asian  countries,
however.Part  I:  The Existing System
Old-Age Security in the Command Economy
Public pension systems in EECA countries began at about the same time as in the
OECD countries - during the first decades of the 20th century.  Prior to World War II,
most were modest  systems, intended to be a funded system of comprehensive  'worker's
insurance', based on the German model.  Most formal sector workers were covered, but the
self- employed, small businesses, and those working in agriculture were in general not
covered.
These modest systems changed dramatically  after World War II, as central planning
was introduced  across Centrl  and Eastern Europe.  Coverage expanded  rapidly, as these
systems became  the third leg of the cradle-to-grave  minimum  income and living standard
security which socialism  promised citizenry who played according to the rules of the game.'
The first leg was support for families with children: universal family benefits, child care,
education, health services, etc.  The second leg covered working life, and promised a job
(accrding  to the individual's skil  level), with a modest and basically un-ifferentiated wage,
for the active period (18 or school leaving age to 55 for women, 60 for men), coupled -1th
full short-term benefits (sickhn  and maternity  leave, worker's compensation,  etc.). 2 The
third leg was a pension, with almost complete  salary replacement. Together, the three legs
assured income security to households.
The introduction  of the command economy  changed household  behavior dramat;cally
over the post-war period.  Guaranteed  jobs and child benefits, combined with the prevailing
political view that both sexes had an obligation  to work and the economic difficulty  of living
on one salary, sentumillions  of women-into  the labor force, such that today, EECA countris
have the highest female labor force participation  rates in the world (World Bank, 1993).
Indeed, in Russia, women outnumber men in the workforce.  At the same time, labor force
participation  declined among workers over 55 (Mitchell, 1992).  Given the high returns to
unpaid work under central planning (e.g. standing  in food rationing queues, getting permits,
etc.), and a rationing system which tended to award consumer  durables and housing based  on
age or time in queue, the older population  could live reasonably well on a pension income,
small accumulatod  assets and housing entitlements. In rural areas, the elderly usually had
access to agricultual land for a subsistence garden plot as well.  This command economy
' Me-ing,  worked directly for the state in state enterprises, or in statsponsored  cooperatives;  about 9596
of the populan  in most countries.
2  In countries with a large rual  population,  a larger eamnings  differential  was observed  in the 1980s.
However, this differenil  never came close to that commonly  observeci  in non-EECA  countries with similr
income levels.  See Atlinson and Mickelwright,  (1993) for this analysis.-4-
rationing system (as well a constant housing shortage) also encouraged multigenerational
households  and intra-household  transfers of time and money as both were needed under
cental  planning  if an a.equate living standard was to be acquired.  Partly as a result of these
press  res, as well as controls on movement  which inhibited labor mobility, and cultural
traditions, multi-generational  income pooling arrangements persisted in Eastern Europe much
longer than in Western Europe, complementing  and reinforcing the three legs of the official
system. (Porket, 1980).  Imbedded  in the extensive tax and transfer system were major
disincentives  to efficient resource allocation, but this was of little concern under central
planning.
As in all other countries, the introduction  of  PAYG funding  permitted the granting of
generous benefits.  Early retirement  was encouraged and liberl  disability  provisions were
provided, to make way for new workers.  Replacement  rates were high in Central Europe.
For example, in 1970, the average old-age pension awarded was 73 percent of the net wage
in Poland (Porket, 1980). However, in the Soviet Union and the Balkans, rates tended to be
lower - in the same year, the average pension in payment in Romania was 40 percent of net
waies (the average newly awarded pension was somewhat  higher).  There were few
opportunities  for financial  savings and low take home-incomes,  social insurance was the only
vehicle for consumption  smoothing. As a result, the active as well as retired depended on
the guarantew of the government  (Porket, 1980).
Not surprisingly, the combination  of demographic  trends and behavioral responses to
the incentives  expanded pension  dependency  ratios and expenditures. By the second half of
the 1980s, systems which had been in surplus, transferring resources to the general budget,
began experiencing  revenue shortfalls  (e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania).  (See graphs.)
Despite these high expenditures,  macroeconomically  the system still appeared affordable in
the context If the centrally  planned model.  Compared to the massive redistribution of
resources tLrough  subsidies, transfer prcing,  and the like which characteriz-d the centrally
planned economy, transfers for pensions were not a large share of the budget -- less than 20
percent in most countries.
Characteristics  of EECA Systems Today
Dwring  the establishment  of communism  in EECA, social institutions  were
harmonized  across countries. They still exhibit a striking number of common characteristics,
described below.
Only one pillar.  EECA countries have one, publicly managed, redistributive system
(with a limited earnings link, see below), with no other pillars.  This contrasts with the
situation  in most middle income countries, which tend to have complementary  private
pension programs for the middle and upper classes, and a more developed  financial sector
offering better savings opportunities  for all, permitting much greater risk diversification  for
the active population.  Other pillars did not emerge in EECA countries because under central
planning, all long term financing  needs were handled by the state -- there was no demand forlonger term financial  intermriiation.  In the richer countries, urban households  did generate
some personal savings, primarily  owing to the shortage of consumer goods to buy.  Most of
these savings were held in state b:nks earning low rates of interest, (and have been inflated
away as prices were liberalized) 3.
A2ar-uWversal  coverage  As a result of the collectivization  of agriculture, the
formalization  of the service sectL: and the organization  of the remaining  parts of the
agricultural setor  into cooperatives, near-universal  coverage was obtained.  The privatization
of the agricultural, commercial  and service sectors is now eroding this feature, as a non-
contributing  private sector is emerging'.
Old-age  risurance  unfled with short-term  insurance  and other  programs. Outside  of
the FSU and the Czech and Slovak Republics, the risk of loss of income in both the short
and long tern  is covered in a unified insurance scheme with one contribution  rate and pooled
funds.  Typicaily, these schemes cover loss of income due to injury, sicimess  (occupational
or otherwise), maternity and infant child care responsibilities,  as well as disability  and old-
age.  Many also incluts non-insurance  benefits such as family allowances  or social welfare
payments in the system as well.  In Hungary, before the 1991 reform, the same fund also
covered health expenditures. In the FSU until 1990, all social insurance benefits were
included in the normal state budget (Liu, 1992).  Pensions and child allowances  are still
lumped together in severl  FSU countries.
PAYGJiuding.  Most non-FSU systems registered surpluses  into the 1980s. These
surpluses  were not held in the funds, but were turned over to the central government. While
many funds in the FSU are running surpluses today, few outside the FSU do.  The notable
exception  is Romania.  In Romania  and in those countries where the funds run surpluses, the
reserves are held in accounts  earning negative rates of interest.  As a result, the reserves are
disappearing. In 1991, the loss in valuie  of the reserves was estimated  ai ,wo percent of
GDP, a hefty inflation tax.  In Romania and the FSU, these sirpluses are an important
source of deficit financing for the central government.
Low retirement ages and special regimes.  Normal retirement with full pension in
most countries in 1989 was 60 for men and 55 for women.  In most countries, special
regimes for selected occupations  or industries (such as heavy industry or mining) offer
retirement with full pension as early as 45 for women and 55 for men.  For example, in
Poland in 1990, 40 percent of all old age pensioners  were below the standard retirement  age
(Maret and Schwartz, 1993). This results in an average effective reLrement  age in EECA of
I  In 1987, a voluntary, funded  pillar was started in the Russian state insurance  company. Rornania  also
experimented  with a voluntary funded  pillar, but fiscal  exigencies soon turned the 'supplementary' program into
a mandatory, PAYG one.
4  In Romania, the agriculture  sector was exempt from all taxation for tlree years following  the land
reform.  As a result, a large non-contributing  sector has developed.- 6 
about  57 for men,  53 for women. Given  an average  life expectancy  at age 60 of 16 years
for men and 19 years  for women,  these  retirement  ages leave  an average  post-retirement  life
of over  25 years!5 Since 1989,  several  countries  have  raised  the retirement  age or reduced
the privileges  for selected  occupations.  The fiscal  cost of these  low retirement  ages will
continue  into the next century,  however.
High and  grow7ng  dependency  ratios. As  a result of the nost-war  demogr.-hic  trends
as well  as the low retirement  ages, syswtm  dependency  ratios are high in the European
countries. Ihe r&io  of pensioners  to contributors mges  from .33 in Kyrgyzstan  (a
demographically  younger  country)  to .87 in Bulgaria  (Table  1).  Note  that these  rates  are 30
to  0 pcnt  higher  than the old-age  dependency  ratio  primarily  because  of the early
rlzmmgnLage  . By  comparison,  in the OECD,  system  dependency  is only 8 percent  higher
than demographic  dependency.  In most  of the Cerrtal European  systems,  the combination  of
reduced  numbers  of contributors  (caused  by unemployment  and evasion  by the private  sector)
and demographic  trends are expected  to push  this ratio to one by the end of the decade
(barrLng  major  reforms).
High  ccpe.fr4  kyels and contnibuion  rates. Total social  securitv  system  outlays  as
a share  of GDP  are  high and have  been  rising  over the last decade. (Graph  1). Pension
expenditures  are normally  two-thirds  to three-fourths  of total social  security  system  outlays.
By 1992,  many  EECA  countries  were spending  as much  in percent  of GDP as the OECD
welfare  states,  where  per capita  incomes  are at least  five times  higher. In OECD  countries,
labor's share  in GDP is high, and therefore  this level of expenditures  has thus  far been
affordable,  albeit  requiring  high payroll  taxes.  But  in EECA  countries,  the share  of labor
income  in GDP  is more typial of middle  income  developing  countries,  (e.g. about  one-half
to one third  that of OECD  countries),  so contribution  rates had to be raised  to exorbitant
levels  to support  these  benefits  - a'-ost 50 percent  of payroll  for short  and long term
benefits. These  rates  are typicaUy  levied  on the payroll  (not  on the individual,  except  in
Hungary  and the former Yugoslavia)  and paid entirely  by the firm, obscuring  the cost  of
these  systems  to the active  generations.
High  stnatory replacement  rates,  few provisions  for indexaton. Statutory
replacement  rates  tended  to be about 80 percent  of net wages,  with actual  replacement  rates
averaging  slightly  less.  Pensions  were based  on the last three to five years' earnings,
unadjusted  for inflation. Usually  pension  payments  were also not indexed,  but subject  to ad
hb  adjustments.  During  the period  of administered  prices, the average  pension  tended  to be
close  to the statutory  replacement  rate and the lack  of indexation  was not a problem  because
infla';on  was negligible. Those  receiving  full  pensions  (most  pensioners)  had a dependable
income  replacement  stream. As prices  have  been  freed  during  the transition,  inflation  has
eroded  the real value  of pensions  and compressed  the distribution  so that in many  countries,
the median  penmon  is the minimum  pensiont.  For example,  in Russia,  50 percent  of
pensioners  now receive  the minimum  pension,  in Kyrgyzstan  over 70 percent.  In Romania,
'  These life expectancy  data are for Hungary, and were calculated  for the author by the Statistical  Institute.7 -
the ratio of the average pension to the average net wage was about 65 percent throughout  the
1980s. It fell to about 40 percent during the initial period of price liberalization. Indexation
provisions rcently  introduced  liave maintained  this ratio.  Exceptions  are Polano and
Slovenia,  who have maintained  or raised the average relative to the average wage since 1i89.
Actuarially  unfair  beneflit  inosions,  perverse  redistributione.  Prior to 1989, many
countries also varied the tax rate by sector, creating p;rverse redistributions  as those  eligible
for early retirement  usually paid equal or lower contributions,  despite receiving a pension  at
retirement with a much greater present discount d value.  These workers tended to be the
highest paicl  as well.  Benefit accrual provisions are usually  constant or reduced over time,
providing  little or no increase in benefits for worling past the normal retirement age.  Some
countries impoM  a tax on employees who continue working while collecting a pension,
discouraging  employees  from worldng in the formal sector past retirement age.  (In the FSU,
workers were encouraged  to continue employment,  as upon reaching full retirement age they
could both work and receive their pension, with a re-adiustment  taking place once real
retirement took place).  Credit was also given for non-active  periods (e.g. service in the
military, matetnity leave, university studies).  Recently 3ulgaria and Romaniz have
introduced  higher contribution  rates for those eligible for early retirement in an attempt to
reduce the anti-actuarial  bias of the system, while the Baltics have removed this provision
entirely.  Several countries have increased pensions  for worling past retirement age.
Liberal  disability  cernificadon. Certification  for disability  is quite lax.  It is usually
done by a local doctor, and in some countries it was common to pay the doctor a 'tip'  for
providing this certification. In Bulgara,  12 percent of pensions paid are for disability, in
Hungary 30 percent of pensioners  receive disability  pensions, and in Poland is a whopping
36 percent of pensions  are for disability.
Taxation  of benefits.  Cash transfers of all kinds have been exempt from  income tax
system, which to date has been primarily a wage tax system.
Impact  of the Transition
The transition has been hard on pensioners. As a result of the sharp fall in GDP,
living standards of all groups are declining. The decline in GDP, combined v,ith a crisis in
tax administration  is causing g  ernment revenues to evaporate, including those earmarked
for the pension system.  As a icsult, average pension  benefits have fallen in real terms in
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and the former Yugoslavia  since 1989.  Meanwhile,
the returns to non-market  tine  have also plummeted  as market pricing has eliminated  queues.
Thus the opportunities  for the retired to supplement  their resources with non-market  work are
declining.  Although all available data suggest that pensioners  are no worse off than other
groups (indeed some ale better off), survey research shows this group less likely to support
reform programs, and less optimistic about their future (Rose and Haerpfer, 1993).-8-
Box 1:  Are the Aging Poor in ECA?
Preventing  the emergence  of old-age poverty  through  a combination  of forced savings  and
redistribuCon  to the lifetime  poor was one of the main motives  for creating  public pet,sion  schemes.
Howcver,  as PAYG schemes mature  and the fiscal cost mcunts,  questions  are increasingly  raised as to how
much of the active generation's income should be transferred  on an entitlement  basis to the old, given the
needs of the younger  poor, including  public  spending  priorides such as transfers  to the working  poor or
improved  public education  systems. The answer  to this question  depends  in part on how poor the inactive
generation is, reladve to the acdve, and what other resources  the older generations  have at their disposal to
alleviate poverty.
It is difficult to get a good picture  of poverty  in EECA  countries,  as this was nct a focus ot public
policy prior to the transition. A1tiough  most countries  do cond&et  household  income  and -xpenditure
surveys, coverage  in these surveys  is incomplete  and biased towards  those working  in state enterprises. A
few private  surveys hove been conducted  since the transition  with more  complete coverage,  providing  a
complement  to the official data.
All analyses of household  incomes  and expendiPlres  in EECA i;ountries  during the transition  show
an increase  in poverty (Sipos, 1992).  This is not surprising,  given the enormous  decline in GDP which  has
occurred. In all cases most of the Door  are not pensioners. Although  pensions  have fallen in real terms,
pensioners  appear to have fared  much better during the first years of the transition  than other households,
especially  young household  with children. In Hungary,  pension-aged  people are much less likely to be in
poor households  than active-aged  or children  (van de Walle, Ravallion,  and Gautam, 1993). In Poland
between  1989 anrl 1991,  poverty  rates went up in all social  groups except  pensioners  (Milanovic,  1993). In
Russia,  a survey o  ,ducted in the fall of 1992  showed  that the pension-aged  population  is under-represented
in poor households,  while children  under 15 were over-represented.  22 percent of the pension-age
population  live in poverty, compared  to a poverty  rate of 37 percent for the whole  population. 19 percent of
poor households  were headed by a pensioner  according to this survey; the rest were headed by an active-age
person. (World Bank, 1993).
If pensions  are so low (below subsistence  in many countries),  why aren't peneioners  poor?  Several
factors account for this paradox. The main reason  is many pensioners  continue  to work. In Belarus, 20
percent of pensioners  continue  to work in the same  job.  In urban Russia, 32 percent of the population  over
60 has a full-time  job, and 5 percent have two jobs! (Boeva  and Shironin, 1992). Similar  ratios hold in
Hungary  and Bulgaria (Sziracski  and WindeVl  1992). Many pensioners  have garden plots or access to
agricultural  land. In 1986,  considering  both formal and informal  activity,  Petkov  and Minev  (1989) found
that only 20 percent of Bulgarian  pensioners  "ceased  work entirely."
The secnn"'  factor is that most pensioners  do not live alone, so intra-household  transfers  are also
important  in keeping pensioners  out of poverty.  60 percent of those over 60 in urban Russia live in
households  where at least one member  has a full-time  job, and half live in households  which have access to
land on which they grow food.  In Bulgaria,  roughly  half of pensioners  live with their children. Studies in
Hungary  and Russia found that  pensions  are an important  source  of household  income for households  across
the income spectrum. This is because  pensions,  being earrings-related,  rise with household  income.
Although  recent  inflation has eroded significantly  the real value of savings,  nonetheless,  30 percent of the
elderly  in urban Russia reported  living off of savings  during 1992. Finally,  private inter-household  transfers
probably  play a key role, although  we have no data on this yet.
(Continued)-9-
It is also important  to recognize  that in EECA  countries today, monetary  income is stil a poor
indicator  of well-being. In recent household  surveys  in EECA countries,  Rose and Haerpfer  (1993) found
the correlaiion  between  monetary  income and total income to be quite low. When households  were asked
whether  they were saving,  dissaving,  or "ge'ting by" - consuming  their income  only -- the largest share were
"getting  by".  However,  there was no relationship  between  the amount of monetary  income the household
earned each month and whether households  were "getting  by".
In addition to the income measured  by household  surveys, most pensioners  are also better off than
the average population  because they are more likely to have access to cheap housing. (This is a windfall  not
considered  as income in most poverty  studies;  van de Walle, Ravallion,  and Gautam  (1993), for Hungary  is
the exception). In Hungary,  Georgia,  Lithuania,  and Bulgaria,  the majority of housing stock is privately
owned, bought  by the current  owners at highly preferential  prices. In other countries,  housing  stock is
publicly owned,  and rents are kept artificially  low. While some of the housing  is up for sale, rent control
reguladons  and prohibitions  against eviction  protect the aging. Meanwhile,  younger  people without  older
relatives in the same location  are stuck paying  for higher-priced  private rental housing.
While many pensioners  may be better off than the average  citizen, anecdotal  evidence  suggests that
there are pockets  of very vulnerable  older people. In major  cities in Russia, the NGO CARE found that
found that a substantial  proportion  of those over 60 reported  losing five kilos or more  over the last six
months. In Romania,  a survey by HelpAge  identified  some pensioners  (primarily  in rural areas) living  alone
with little money for food or fuel.  In all surveys,  pensioners  reported  a high degree of psychological  stress,
given their fixed incomes  and uncertain  inflation. Access to health care was also a problem  for most of the
old-aged  population,  as medicine  at controlled  prices was rarely available,  and doctors required  "tips" in
order for a patient to be treated.
In sum, over the next few years, while public  resources  are expected  to be very tight and needs of
all populations  great, poverty  alleviation  objectives  could be served  by cutting  back pensions  and spending
more resources  on the working  poor. Pensions should be reduced at the high end of the income spectrum,
and for those still able to work (e.g. men and women below  65 without  a disability). A flat pension or
means-tested  pension would clearly  be more equitable,  combined  with special  programs  for the aging, (such
as meals on wheels  for those with mobility  problems,  or the creation  of senior support networks). As
means-tested  assistance  programs  are created,  they should also be available  to this group.
Pensioners may indeed have less reason to be optimistic.  While the long run prospects
for economic  growth are good, in the short run, they are uncertain  at best, providing  few
opportunities  for pensioners  to improve their position. Privatized  assets currently being
distributed are not liquid enough to improve living standards of many pensioners today.  As
the economy changes, the pattern of household  income pooling and income security  needs are
also changing. Younger  cohorts may no longer wish to share housing or income with their
older relatives. They, for the first time, are able to accumulate  assets and savings to meet
part of these needs, and most wish to do so.  As a result, a major conflict exists between the
entitlement  of the generations  who have retired or are about to retire with little old-age
security and the living standards  of the active generations.- 10 -
Reform Isues
To be successful, the reform of the system should address the following  major
problems:  (a) lack of income security for the aging; (b) perverse redistributions; (c) high
cost; and (d) incentives fcr inefficient  resource allocation.  At the same time, reforms should
increase system taparency  and consumer satisfaction.
Secuity for the aging.  Pension systems in EECA do not any more provide
consumpton smoothing  and old-age income security, two of their key goals.  Rather than
replacing lifetime  earnings in a dependable  fashion for contributors, public pension benefits
are quite uncetain, as inflation has ravaged pension  entitlement in most countries, reducing
them to the minimum, or in case of Estonia, a flat rate.  The poverty reduction objective
appears to be the only system objective now met, as pensioners are still better off on average
than other groups  dita  receiving pensions  below the estimated subsistence  rate in some
countries.  However, pockets of poverty are being to emerge where pensioners  lack
complementary  sources of support.  (See Box 1).
Equiy-. EECA pension systems are also inequitable, both within and among
generations.  Redistributions  occur in pension systems when pensioners receive more in
benefits than thty would have under an actuarially  fair annuity plan given their contributions.
Using this yardstick, even the near-subsistence  level benefits many gensioners  now receive
involve m_or redistrib  . IS  is Vrmarily the result of the low retLow
contribution  rates in the 1970s  and early 1980s  also account for this result.
Inequitable  redistributions within cohorts occurs as well through the special early
retirement  programs. These programs are quite regressive, as usually the highest  paid
workers were eligible for them.  In Bulgaria in 1990, the ratio of the present value of the
pension at retirement to the present value of contibutions for an early retiree in the highest
labor category (i.e. one that retires 10 years earlier) was 3 times that of a normal retiree
(using  a modest  rate of interest and discount rate). I  Early retirement ages for women
combined with pension base crecit for maternity  leave also results in significant
redistributions  given women's longer life span.
Affordability. Public pension expenditure  consumes much more of available resources
in EECA countries than in other countries at the same income level.  For example, pension
expenditures  are about 11 percent of GDP in Hungary and Poland, 14 percent in Ukraine and
Slovakia,  and 10 percent in Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia and Uzbekistan, compared with 8
'  If early peauoas wen  acWally  deferred  compensaion, then the above argument  analysis does not rlly
apply.  However,  the PAYG, payroll tax funding  was then not appropriate; enterpises employing  these  worker
should be required to contribute  more as their workers retire. Give.a  the current financing  methods, these
benefits  are inequitable.*  11 
percent for Portugal, 3 percent for Argentina, and 5 percent for Israel.'  Countries with
younger demographic  structure but similar income level spend even less.  Expenditures  as a
share of GDP are expected to continue rising for the foreseeable  future, as a result of a
continued aging of the population.  This raises a serious affordability  issue.  Faster
transition to the market economy will only worsen this problem.
Under central planning, transfers of up to 10 percent of GDP for pensions appeared
affordable.  Government  revenues and expenditures  were typically  about 50 percent of GDP,
and these were extracted directly from state-owned  enterprises by state-owned  banks, so tax
administration  was relatively simple.  This efficient and effective  tax administration has
changed as market forces have been introduced. Banks are not willing to collect taxes, so
administration  system has to be built up from scratch.  As a result, tax  revenues are
shrinking rapidly.
Many EECA countries consider the current fiscal crisis temporary, caused primarily
by the need to improve administration. However, EECA countries should not expect to
return to previous revenue levels in a mixed system or market economy, as it is neither
deirable  nor feasible for the government to collect such a large share of GDP in taxes.  It is
not desirable because taxes distort economic  incentives, stimulating  unproductive  rent-seeking
activities and lowering the rate of economic  growth.  Higher tax rates distort more, causing
more evasion, requiring more resources devoted to adminitation  and therefore collecting
less net revenue.  It is not feasible because there are practical limits to tax administAt  in
a market economy, where economic  activity is decentrlized.  Most countries with a GDP
per capita of about US$2000 are only able to collect 23-25 percent of GDP in taxes, below
the average in OECD countries.  This is because tax administration  systems are typically
weak, and wage income (on which it is easier to collect taxes than rents or profits) is a
smaller share of GDP than in OECD countries.
EECA governments  need to adjust their expenditure  promises to meet a more realistic
revenJe celing.  Assuming that EECA governments  face an overall tax ceiling of 25 percent
of GDP, collecting  one-third to one-half of this potential  revenue in payroll taxes and
spending it on pension benefits appears unwise.  On the expenditure  side, all EECA countries
face urgent needs for govemment spending.  Hospitals  need rehabilitation, school need an
overhaul and teachers need training, the communications  infrastructure  is inadequate for
participation  in the international  economy, the unemployed  need to be retrained, crime needs
to be prevented, etc.  At the same time, the high payroll taxes have already encouraged
evasion and avoidance, resulting  in a shrinking tax base.  For example, in Poland in 1992,
an estimated 10 percent of the non-agricultural  labor force evaded payroll taxes.  Arrears
among those who did pay are also climbing.  Raising  payroll taxes to finance increasing
pension expenditure is not likely to resolve the affordability  problem, but will instead reduce
employment  in the formal sector and accelerate the development  of the underground
economy, exacerbating  revenue collection problems for the whole tax system.
' 'Me EECA numben are from Table 2 and are mostly 1992; the data on other countries are from the
World Bank Old-Ag Security  Project database  and are 1989.- 12 -
Micro-economic  efficiency.  EECA countries  are also becoming increasingly
concerned  about the micro-economic  effects of the current system. High payroll tax rates
have placed a significant  wedge between the take-home  wage and labor costs, distorting
demand for labor.  Administered  wages and a binding  minimum  wage prevent the firm from
fully shifting these costs to the worker. This wedge is particularly  undesirable  now, as the
obsolete technology  and inefficient  enterprises  common in EECA countries have placed them
in a situation  of labor surplus  and low productivity. Increases  in contribution  rates have
aggravated  the worsening  of labor relations durina the transition,  as workers are receiving low
and falling real wages, and therefore demanding  increases  from employers  facing high and
rising real labor costs. This has greatly complicated  the political  economy of stabilizatit
The early retirement  age for full pension and the lack of incentives  for continued
formal or official work, provides a major disincentive  for labor supply to the formal sector,
and a major incentive  for older workers to retire and enter into unofficial  or informal
activities. Attempts to increase employment  of younger workers  in public enterprises  during
the transition by lowering retirement  in Romania and Bulgaria  have been a costly mistake,  as
already overstaffed  enterprises  did not take on new, inexperienced  workers in place of the
older, more experienced  ones.  Instead,  overall employment  fell, and the pension burden
increased. (See Box 2).
Box 2:  Should  early retirement with full pension be used to resolve unemployment problems in ECA?
One of the most daunting  issues in EECA  countries is the adjustment  in the labor market. Central
planning  encouraged  not only an inefficient  structure  of production,  but also at the plant level, inefficient use
of factors  of production,  including  excess labor. The introduction  of scarcity  prices (especially  for energy
and raw materials)  and more economic  openness has made much of the industrial  sector activity in EECA
unsustainable. Plant closings  and other restructuring  aLLivities  are expected  to leave 20-40  percent of the
labor force unemployed  for some period of time in the medium  tern.
If these countries follow  macroeconomic  and sectoral  policies which  encourage  a flexible  labor
market and stimulate  demand  for labor, long run employment  opportunities  for most of the active population
are good.  Most have a high level of educational  attainment,  and the sectors  which are expected to expand
are the more labor intensive  (e.g. the service sector). The short to medium run is another question,  however.
Concern  is high in countries  unused to labor market mobility  and unemployment  over the social costs of the
mass layoffs  required.  The specter  of able-bodied  men and women walking the street without  any work or
source of income was quite frightening.
To respond  to these concerns,  countries have adopted  three tactics. Virtually  all have now
introduced  some form of unemployment  compensation,  which pays a benefit  for specified  period of time (6-
12 months, depending  on the country). These benefits  are financed  by payroll taxes. Most countries have
also started programs  for the unemployed,  including  counseling,  job placement,  and retraining. Some
countries have also introduced  early retirement  schemes,  allowing  the unemployed  to take a full pension up
to five years earlier. This provision  has encouraged  firms to lay-off  older workers,  as they are perceived
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by both employers  and unions to have a secure social safety net.  As a result, pension roles have swelld.
In Bulgaria  during the period that this provision  was in force the number  of new pensioners  added per
annum was thre  times the average for the previous five years.
Th  argumzs  for the early retiremnent  were both economic  and social.  Socially,  pensioning
workers was consdered more humane than simply providing  unemployment  benefits. Economically,  it was
argued that many of the workcen  were unproductive,  and therefore their wages  were indirectly  a drain on
the budget (in the form of increased  subsidies  or lower profits).  As pensions  are lower than wages,  en't
pensions  chape?
Both of thm  arguments  have proven to be mistaken.  From a fiscal point of view, unemploymuw
benofits  ar  much cheapr  than paions.  Consider  two cses.  In case P. the firm lays off a worker at ip
50 who is eligible for retirement  at 55. The worker tak  the pension, suppleents  the income with a sall
amot  of informal sctor  income, and lives a comfortable  life.  Both the pension  and the infomal sector
income  are Lot taxed.  The cost to the budget  is five extra years of pension payments  du  the los  of tax
revenue (payroll and other wage taxes) from the worker for those five yeas.  In case U, a worker age 30 is
laid off.  The worker receives unemployment  benefits,  perhaps takes some retrining,  perps  works for
some time in the informal  sector, and eventually  enters the formal sector after two years. The cost to the
budgp is 6-12 mouths of unemployment  benefits,  plus the loss of tax revenue  for two years.  This is
sigificantly lower than tho costs under case P.  Indeed, even if the worker never returns to the formal
sctor.  the cost of case U is only one-tenth  to one-fifth  tt  of case P.  Plus, total production  will be highr
under cas  U.
It could be argued that it was worth paying the ficl  cost for social reasons.  However, there is
little evidence  tht  the pensioner is happier than younger  worker who has found a new carer.  Interviw
in oet  Germany in 1992 show that many workers in their 50s who were given early retiromt  ae  bittar
and depressed. They feel worthless,  used-upo. Few are motivated to retrain, as they wonder who win
want them after their training.  And indeed, retraining  has not been very successful  in other countries whon
given to older workes.  Meanwhile, the younger workers are much more flexible  and willing to invest in a
new skill or a new sector.  They are optimistic  about their future.
For these reasons, using pension policy  to encourage firms to lay-off older workers is not
recommended.
The early retirement provisions for workers in special occupations  are inefficient for
another reason - they represent a socialization  of the costs of poor occupational  health and
safety.  Employers have no incentive to improve workplace safety.
Transparency. The operation  of pension systems is not transparent.  Contributions
are paid almost entirely by employers, obscuring the costs of the system to employees, who
bear much of the burden of the tax through lower wages (or unemployment  and lower
economic growth).  The intermingling  of pension  contributions  and expenditures  with other
benefits further obscures the costs of the various programs to the taxpayers.  During the
years in which the system was in surplus, funds were transferred to the central budget,
further breaking the benefit-contribution  link.  The numerous special regimes weaken this
link even more.- 14 -
Consumer  safaction.  The erosion of entitlements  by inflation and the uncertainty
surrounding  future benefits has created enormous dissatisfaction  with the public scheme.  In
Uzbekistan,  dissaisfied pensioners have even created their own political party.  Many
members  of the active population are also voting with their feet, and legally or illegally
opting out of public pension progrms.  In addition, as wages increase and the structure of
wages decompresses,  a large pent-up demand for pure earnings-related, private or quasi-
private schemes is emerging  (i.e. other pillars).  This poses two problems.  First,  iis
dissaisfcon  nwith  the public scheme, especially  among younger cohorts for whom the rate
of return to contributions  is negative, has caused tax evasion and avoidance, reducing
revenues.  Second, if history is any guide, private and/or occupational  plans will emerge to
meet this demand. Hungary has recently enacted legislation authorizing private pensions,
supported by tax incentives.  Autonomous,  complementary  schemes have also been proposed
by politicians  in Romania, Poland and the Czech republic.  Already in Russia and Bulgaria,
private financial  institutions  are beginning to offer pension schemes.'  As there is no
effective  regulatory framework in most countries  for private schemes, the possibilities  for
consumer  fraud are high.
In sum, EECA pension systems simultaneously  offer benefits which are quite low yet
unaffordable. This is because too much of  money is spent on transfers to people who would
normally work in other middle income countries (i.e. those 45-65).  As a result, these
unaffordable  systems are actually providing benefits which are barely adequate or even in
some countries  inadequate to meet the income security needs of the real target population  -
those 65 and above.  As the role of the government  in the economies  declines and the private
sector grows, these EECA income transfer systems,  including pensions systems will only
become more unaffordable. This excess government  consumption will crowd out the major
investments  needed to put these countries on a sustainable  growth path, compromising
economic  growth.
Major reforms in entidtlements  are needed to ensure that public pension systems can
perform their redistributive role of preventing  elderly poverty in an affordable manner into
the next century.  At the same time, instruments  which would permit the active generations
to take responsibility  for part of  their own income security needs should be provided. This
must be accomplished  in manner conducive  to the development  of an efficient market
economy, with adequate risk diversification  for all age groups-a  multi-pillar system.  This
implies an enhanced role for private and funded schemes, which should also assist in
mobilizing  savings needed for the restructuring.
I  In Russia, at last  12 private  fnds  are  alredy  operating  and over 50 are in the process of being set up.- 15 -
Part  II:  Options for the Future
EECA countries will have to adopt a comprehensive  reform of their pension systems
eventually, as the squeeze of declining revenues and increasing  claims will only get worse
over time.  A successful  reform is likely to involve adding at least one more pillar.  Below,
some approaches  to developing  the multi-pillar  system are outlined. 9
EECA pension systems today face a conflict  between the objectives of savings and
insurance (old age security for the middle and upper classes) and redistribution (old-age
security for the lifetime poor).  This conflict is inherent in an earnings-related  PAYG system,
which tries to address two problems with one instrument. Public pension systems were
created to reduce elderly poverty both by- (a) increasing  savings for old age and (b) reducing
elderly poverty through cash transfers to those who cannot save enough (the lifetime  poor).
PAYG systems face conflicts between these objectives  because of realizing the savings
objective  requires an investment, while realizing the redistribution  objective requires a
transfer program.  Countries have tried to resolve this conflict by partially funding the public
system (e.g. U. S. and Japan, where the surplus is invested in government bonds).  Others
have encouraged  or even mandated  fualded,  privately-maaaged  pensions systems as the main
old-age savings instrument for middle and upper income workers.
We recommend  an alternative approach for transition economies.  Rather than attempt
to pardally fund the public system, we recommend  scaling back the public system and
developing  a universal mandatory savings system for the second pillar.  Under such a
system, the PAYG public pillar would carry primary responsibility  for  providing
redistributive twansfers. The second pillar would be a funded, mandatory, privately-
managed, savings system, similar to that found today in Chile, and under development  in
Mexico and Argentina. As it would be mandatory, coverage would be higher than in OECD-
type occupational  schemes. Together, these two pillars should provide income replacement
for the average worker equal to about 40 percent of gross wages (more for lower income
workers, less for higher income workers, who will have other assets).
Implementing  a two-pillar system in EE_A countries implies first and foremost
reducing entitlements  in the public scheme, and consequently  the share of income the active
age cohorts pay in contributions. If not, there will be no room for the growth of other
pillars, as employees  will have no money left to save.  This is a particularly difficult problem
in EECA countries, as most are faced with a very sizeable population  of 50 years and older.
The old-age security needs of this group are significantly  different than those of the active
generation.
Providing  for  the older age cohorts.  The generations  already retired or about tco  retire
had fewer opportunities  to save, as most income was earned during the period of central
I  The concepual basi  for the approach described  here is found  in James, (1992) and is elaborated  in the
World Bank's forthcoming  Old-Age  Security Report.*:6  -
planning, when salaries were low and pensions were supposedly  guaranteed.  In addition,
during the last years of their working life (e.g.  1985-1995)  economic growth was very low or
highly negative, so incomes were falling.  In any case, those households  in this group which
did have some liquid savings before the transition lost it in the ensuing inflation.  Some
additional wealth may come to this generation through privatization  (e.g. the distribution to
the population  of assets held by the state).  The extent to which the wealth of this group
increases will vary from country to country, and even within cohorts, the distribution  of
wealth and opportunities  is unlikly  to be equal.  Thus, members of this generation  are
potentially  quite vulnerable to the income fluctuations  of the market economy.
Intr-family  pnvate transfers w:ii undoubtedly  be important  in sustaining  this group.
Many will also continue to work beyc  '  the currently very low pension  age -- either in the
formal or informal economy  - and this should  be encouraged as part of the reform.
However, for the majority, the primary source of income is likely to be the public system,
financed  by PAYG transfers  from the active population.  This implies the continuation, in the
short run, of a substantial  intergeneational transfer.  How much should the active generaton
pay to the inactive, knowing  that the dependency  ratio is increasing  and they must save for
their own retirement?  How should this transfer be financed (i.e. how can the double savings
burden be managed)?
As with OECD countries during the depression (when the savings of a generation was
similarly wiped out and the slow economy did not provide much chance for replacement), an
explicit intergeational  transfer appears warranted, both on economic  and social grounds.
Long term development  prospect  are good for all EECA countnes, which should bring not
only income growth but substantial  incmases in labor productivity. Thus, the disposable
income prospects for those just entering the labor force are quite good.  The younger half of
the active genaion  should be able to both pay the burden of partially supporting  older
generations and save, in an additional  pillar, for part of their own retirement income.  And if
the growth forecasts are too optimistic, the burden of paying off part of existing promises
will have to spread across more than one generation, through lower pensions to these
generations and/or debt financing. Whatever  the speed of transition, the key is to set in
motion now, as part of the reform, an explicit policy of multi-pillarism,  and a gradual
reduction in entitlements  from the public system.
Overview of Proposed Reforms
An outline of reform options for EECA countries within the framework presented
above is shown in Box 3.  The timing of the reforms, as well as some of the features of each
pillar, will vary from county to country.  However, _ll countries need to reform the public
pillar to reduce entitlements. Regardless of income, demographic  structure. or level of
developRment,  the most important step for all countries is to raise the effective  retrment  age.
'We  also recommend  that all countries also simplify benefit structures in the public pillar to
eliminate earnings-related  features and accentuate redistributive features. Two options for
doing so aire  presented, the contribution  model and the social assistance model.- 17 -
Box 3:  Outline of Recommended New Systeml
Pillar 1 - The Public Pillar
Variant A:  The Contribution  Model
Eligibility:  All who contributed at least 20 years over minimum
pensionable  ago (at least 65)
Benefit:  Fixed amount per pensioner (flat), or related  positively to yearn
of contribution  (restricted flat)
Financig:  Payroll tax
Avewge replacement  rate:  Initially  30-35 percent of average wage, falling  to 20 percet
over time as other pillars phase-in
Variant B:  The Social Assistance  Model
Eligibility:  All over retirement age (universal  flat) or all poor over
retirement  age (means-tested  flat)
Benefit:  Fixed amount  per pensioner
Financing:  General  revenues or payroll tax
Replacement  rate:
*  Universal  flat  30-35  percent of average wage
*  Means tested flat  30-35  percent of averge  wage
*  Replacement  rate falls to 20 percent over time as other pillars  phase-in
Pillar 2 - The Mandatory Savings Pillar
Finaning:  Minimum  required contribution  from all employed to privately
managed  fund; could be supplemented  by transfers  of shares in
state enterprises (allocated  to contributors)
Benefit:  Contributions  of active plus returns on invested  contributions
(defined  contribution), paid out in set number  of  installments  or
as annuity
Expected  average  Initially,  minimal  for payroll contributions  only,
replacement  rate:  higher if shares of state enterprises  used to start fund; rising to
20-30 percent
Pillar 3 - The Occupational Pillar
Not recommended  in transitional  economies
Complenentary  Systans
Higher income. raRidly  develooine  financial  systems. heavy dependence  on wage income:
means-tested  social assistance  system, community  programs for elderly, informal  support
systems.
Lower income. less developed.  more rwal: informal  support systems.- 18  -
Higher and middle incomae  countries with emerging capital markets should also
develop the second pillar as soon as possible. This could be developed using the
conventional  payroll tax method,which  would  gradually build up balances in each
contributor's account.  It may also be possible for EECA countries to use assets of the state
slated for privatization to jump-start the second pillar, building up the savings of the active
age cohorts more rapidly.  In all cases, entitlements  in the first pillar (and the payroll taxes
to finance them) should be gradually reduced as balances build up in the second pillar.  The
pawe  of this reduction will depend on how quickly the second pillar can be started up (and
whether any state assets  are used to jump start it).
In some countries, voluntary  and quasi-voluntary  (e.g occupation-based)  schemes  are
developing. Governments  should move very quickly to regulate these.  Defined contribution
schemes are recommended. If optional  earnings-related  defined-benefit  schemes are even
allowed, funding  requirements should be set very high to prevent fraud and abuse.  The
volatility of asset values (and exchange rates) in transition economies  will make such systems
extremely  difficult to regulate in the short and medium term.
Liwe  income countries should initally concentrate their efforts on reforming the
public pillar to an affordable level.  Reducing  payroll taxes should be an important  outcome
of the reforms, as these countries are quintessentiaUy  labor-surplus economies. Having the
development  of the private pillar as a medium  term objective will be useful in guiding the
reform in the public pillar.  The average replacement  rate will probably remain at about 35
percent of the avenage  wage for a longer time in these countries.
In all countries, cash benefits nced to complemented  by the development  of
community  social services for the elderly, to break their isolation, assist them in handling the
transition, aid them in living an independent  life as long as possible, and help alert local
assistance agencies to those who are falling through the cracks of the safety net.
A detailed discussion of the application  of this reform framework is provided below.
The experience of the last three years in transition economies  has shown that identifying  the
most promising reform options is not enough.  In the last section of part HI,  a critique of
previous reform efforts is provided, and recommendations  with respect to sequencing  and
implementation  capacity issues.  Obviously,  the design of the reform program should also
take into consideration  sequencing  pension  reform with other reforms (such as privatization
and tax reform), and the weak implementation  capacity in many countries.
Public Pillar Reforms
Retirement age.  The most important  element in EECA reform programs is equalizing
and raising retirement ages.  While it is difficult to state now the appropriate retirement  age
for the next 50 years, given current life expectancies  at retirement, 65 is clearly the
minimum. As life expectancy  is still increasing, by the time the new retirement age is fully
phased in 65 may even be too low.  All special regimes should also be eliminated. As thise Is,  -
will involve raising retirement age by as much as 15 years for a number uf workers, a
phased movement  will be required.  The special regimes are the most expensive, so
retirement ages for these should be raised as soon as possible (e.g. by 1-2 years per annum).
Normal retirement could move on a slower path, e.g. one year per anniwn  for women and 6
months for men 10.
Benefit and Flnancing Reform Options
Although  benefits are notionally earnings related, the failure to either re-value
earnings in calculating  the contribution base or to index pensions  once they have been
provided has created a very flat system in EECA countries.  This provides an excellent
reform opportunity, as  EECA countries only need to accert the flat benefit structure which
has evolved as the basis of the reformed public system, rneeting  the demand for an earnings
related system by adding new pillars.  Alternatively, EECA countries could try to re-
establish a public, earnings-related,  defined benefit system with PAYG funding.  We do not
recommend  this latter option.  However, we also recognize that introducing a flat benefit
may be politically  difficult, especially as the private pillar is not ready to be introduced.
Below, two benefit and fnancing reform options are considered: the contributions  model and
the social assistance  model.
The Contribitlons  Model
This model preserves the notion of a contributions-based  system, but flattens out the
benefit structure.  It is thus a less radical altemative given where EECA countries are now.
Benefits could be equal to all pensioners (flat) or related to years of contribution (modified
flat).  In both cases, the question of pension  level arises.
Flat pensions.  Average pensions relative to the average wage in EECA countries
currently range from 33 percent in Estonia to 74 percent in Poland.  As even countries with
levels under 40 percent are suffering financing crises, (and these crises are likely to worsen
until retirement  age reforms take hold), even this level appears unaffordable.  At the same
time, as there are no other pillars, setting the benefit level as low as 20 percent of the
average wage may not provide enough income support."  Thus, depending on resource
availability, the flat benefit should be set at about 30-35 percent of the average wage for
current recipients.  As the second pillar is introduced, the size of the benefit relative to the
average wage could be gradually lowered to 20 percent (indexing  the benefit to p ices during
a time of real wage growth would accomplish  this).
"  Raising  the retirement age by one or more years per annum  is the same as raising the retirement  age all
at once as  far as the under-age  pensioner looking  for a ul  pension is concerned. However, for the pemoner
looking for a partal pension, the difference  matters. Politically,  the difference  may matter as well.
"  Countries  with an effective, meas-sted  social  assistance  system  could more easily cut back
contribution-related  pension benefits to 20 percent of average wage.- 20 -
Modifled  flat pensions. For EECA  countries,  most of which  already  offer a reduced
pension  after  a minimum  number  of years  of contribution,  implementation  of this option
would  be least  radical. It would  involve  establishing  a minimum  pension  after a number  of
years  of contribution  (e.g. 15 perent of the average  wage  after  20 year of conwribution).
Equal  increases  could  be provided  for each  additional  year.  The increase  could  be doubled
foi each year after the normal  retirement  age (e.g. from .75 percent  to 1.5 percent),  thus
providing  an incentive  to work  longer  during  the transition  to higher  retirement  ages.
Introduction  of a flat  pension  has a tremendous  equity  advantage,  as the current
inequality  among  pensioners  (caused  by the effects  of unanticipated  inflation)  would  be
removed. The main  disadvantages  of a flat pension  system  for EECA  countries  are:
*  Lest incentiye  to contribute. Obviously,  a flat system  offers  little marginal
incentive  for partcipationce  the minimum  contribution  requirement  has been
met. However,  given the weak  lin1mge  between  benefits  and contributions
inherent  in a PAYG,  it is not obvious  that this incentive  in an earnings-related
system  actually  improves  compliance.  Certainly  in EECA  countries,  the
shrinking  tax base  provides  strong  evidence  that those  who can avoid, do.
*  No incentive  to continue  worldng  to achieve  a higher  pension  once minimum
ag  is  rhed.  This point  is more  important,  as measures  to raise the
retirement  age wiU  have to be phased  in.  Thus,  at least until  the end of the
decade,  some  will be eligible  for the costly  early  retirement. A benefit  system
which  rewards  longer  working  provides  a disincentive  to collect  the pension.
The modified  flat rate might  correct  this disadvantage  (although  probably  not
enough). Some  EECA  systems  require  pensioners  to quit working  endrely  to
collect  the pension,  or reduce  the pension  of those  who continued  to work.
These  options  may become  problematic  as the informal  sector  grows.
Pensioners  will take  their pensions  and continue  to work in the informal  sector,
causing  a drop  in revenues  with no concordant  decline  in expenditures.  The
best  option  is probably  to allow  pensioners  to take  their pension  without  penalty
at the legal  retirement  age, "clawing  back' some  of the expenditure  through  the
tax system. Pension  payments  and post-pension  earnings  should  be treated  as
any other  eamings,  subject  to all taxes.
The modified  flat  does not have  the above  disadvantages.  However,  it is more
complicated  administively  as better records  have  to be kept and pensions  have  to be
calculated. It also runs a higher  risk of expenditures  getting  out of control, as EECA
countries  have  a tendency  to set minimums  higher  than is affordable  given the size of the
average  benefit. For example,  if the desired  average  pension  in the public  pillar by 2005  is
20 percent  (in order to leave  room  for the funded  pillar), the minimum  would  have  to be less
than 10  percent  of the average  wage -- very small  by current  EECA  standards.- 21 -
FYnancing  reform.  One of the goals of benefit reform should be a reduction in payroll
taxes to reduce the labor market disincentive  effects, as well as the avoidance  and evasion
problems.  Shifting social assisLnce programs (such as social pensions  or child allowances)
to the centrl  government budget, financed  by general revenues, would also permit a
lowering of tax rates.  With any payroll tax, at least half of the payment responsibility  should
be shifted to the employees  (a deduction form the paycheck). This reform can be done in a
manner which is neutral with respect to take-home  pay (although  it will require some
adjustment  of income or wage tax schedules  as well).  Having the employee  actually see such
a large deduction will be an important  step in improving transparency  and creating a
constituency  for change.
Even if all the recommended  measures  are taken, evasion will continue  to oe a
problem.  In order to increase collections  from the self-employed,  small business (less than
five employees), and agriculture, a special rate with a  presumptive  minimum  tax could be
assessed. This tax should be low enough to encourage  compliance (25 percent of the
minimum  wage, for example). Integrating  payroll tax collection with othtr tax
administration  systems will also help.
Ihe  Social Aslstance Model
Adoption of this model represents an explicit recognition that the public pillar's
function is redistributive, and therefore represents a more radical reform for EECA
countries.  It basically involves unifying  existing social insurance and assistance  programs for
the aging into one program entitlement,  with general revenue financing. Pensions would
either be given to all who reach pensionable  age, regardless of income, wealth  or
contribution  record (the universal flat pension) or to those who have reached retirement age
and whose income is below a given level (the means-tested  flat pension).
A universal  flat pension has all the equity benefits of a contribution-related  flat
pension, but is administratively  even simpler. This is an important  advantage  as most
countries do not yet have central contribution  record keeping systems, so establishing  pension
entitlement  is becoming  a complicated  task in a contributions-based  system. Its universal
coverage also helps to ensure that the poverty reduction objectives  would be met, as there
would be one system paying a benefit to all old people.  Under a contributions-related
system, the elderly poor who have not contributed would be sent to a different system (e.g. a
social assistance system).  The broad coverage would also encourage  political support.
In terms of the poverty alleviation  objective, a means-tested  flat pension might be
cheaper (i.e a special social assistance  system for the aging).  However, caution is suggested
with respect to this approach at this time in most countrics, as the distribution  of overall cash
income is still quite flat, and the administrative  capacity very weak.  Thus, means-testing
could involve significant  administrative  expense, for limited savings. This is especially  true
when considering  the impact of a progressive tax system on a universal system.  Much of the
wastage of a universal system could be "clawed back" through the tax system.  A means-_2 -
tc.sted  system could also have a higher political cost than the flat rate, as a public pension is
still considered an obligation  of the state to all employees who worked for years ?'  low
wages, not a social welfare program.
Financing  reforms.  Adoption of the social assistance model would allow a major shift
in the tax structure, reducing payroll axes while increasing other, broader-based  and less
distorting taxes such as the personal income tax (PIT) and the VAT.  This should  be more
progressive, and lead to higher employment  (especially  in the formal sector).  This change
will have to phased, as part of the major fiscal reforms now underway in EECA countries.
As the VAT and the PIT are only now being established, the payroll tax may have to be
lowered gradually as the others take hold.
Other Public Plliw Reforms
Indexation rules.  Clear rules for adjusting benefits to price  changes should be
enacted, eliminating  the S  hx  measures  now in force.  Given the stabilization  difficulties  of
most EECA countries, g  ur!ireed  full price (or wage) indexation may not be the best choice
for the next few years, eve,  .r the lowest benefits. Tnis is because pension  benefits are
already a very large share nf government  expenditure. Promising full indexation  during a
time of stabilization  and its assocIM.td  expenditure  cuts could result in other programs with a
very high social benefit (such as immunization  programs for children) to be cut back too far.
An alternative could be a monthly indexation  of 80 percent of price changes, plus an annual
review (to allow further corrections if affordable). Once the macro-economy  stabilizes, a
less discretionary  system could be put in place.
Reserves.  Most systems in the FSU, and the Romanian  system, currently keep
reserves, supposedly  for the purpose of financing  futt're obligatiors as the active population
declines.  The desirability  of this policy is questionable,  especially now.  These countries
are currently in severe recession.  Economic  growth is expected to do much more to improve
affordability  than will holding reserves.  At the same time, the presence of large reserve
lioldings  may inhibit reform, and cause a false complacency  regarding future liabilities.
This false complacency  stems directly from the  management  of these reserves by the
independent  pension funds.  Although these reserves are nominally  separate from general
revenues, they are essentially  financing  current government  consumption. This occurs in two
ways.  The first is direct, as negative real interest rates on reserves held in the banking
system impose an inflation tax which lowers their real value." 2 The second is indirect, as
the presence of reserves in banks offsets the borrowing of other government entities thus
lowering the entire public sector borrowing  requirement as well as subsidizing  the price of
this borrowing. Use of reserves in this manner also lowers the transparency  of the fiscal
system and the pension fund, and adds to labor costs.
12  This is actually a  subsidy from taxpayers to borrowers.- 23 -
Recognizing  that the reserves are being eroded, some pension fund managers  have
proposed or even drafted legislation  which would allow them to invest their reserves in rmal
estate or shares of firms to be privatized (e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, FYR Macedonia).
This is a major mistake.  Evidence  from other countries shows that pension reserves invested
by the public sector rarely yields a high rate of return -- on the contrary.' 3 Even more
worrisome is the potential  of the fund managers  to slow down restructuring  by preventing
enterprises in which they hold shares from liquidating  assets or firing excess employees.
This could either happen in response  to political  pressure from unions, or because the fund
managers  themselves  fear the temporary loss of revenue associated  with a mass layoff.
For the immediate  future, we recommend  that the practice of holding more than about
one months' reserves in the public system cease, and payroll taxes be lowered.  In order to
balance the budget, other taxes could be increased in a revenue neutral manner.  In countries
under extreme fiscal distress, where the only tax base remaining is the state sector payroll, in
the short run, a portion of existing payroll taxes could simply be transferred to the central
government  directly, supplementing  other taxts.  This would at least improve transparency,
as well as keeping the excess cash out of the hands of pension fund managers.  It is expected
that in most affected countries, a personal income tax will be introduced  shortly, so shifting
the tax structure out of payroll taxes into those which fiance the central government  budget
would improve the progressivity of the whole tax structure.
Adminustration. Reforming eligibility  requirements such that eligibility  would depend
on contribution,  not on work history as is currently the case in most countries, will require
investment  in a contributions  record base.  This new record system should be automated,  to
facilitate  tax administration. Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Romania have
all begun to deve'ap such a data base, which should facilitate  reform.
Taxation of benefits.  Most EECA countries  do not now have a PIT, but rely on
taxation  of wages and profits at source.  Social insurance benefits and other government
transfers are exempt from these taxes, leading to significant  distortions  in labor supply.  As
PITs are introduced, pensions should be included  in eamnings,  subject to this tax.  This will
also help to improve progressivity.
Reform of disability  programs.  The generous disability  programs should be curtailed
as soon as possible.  As retirement  ages are increased for old-age pensions, the incentive  to
qualify for disability  pensions will increase.  Tightening  up of criteria, monitoring  of
certification,  and benefit reform should all be part of the reform program in order to prevent
a new form of expenditure  growth.
'3  For a review of the Latin American experience,  see Mesa-Lago,  (1991)- 24  a
Funded Systems:  Should EECA Foilow Chile or Germany?
Development  of a policy framework and legislation to support a second pillar of
private, funded programs has not taken place to date in any EECA country.  The main
reason appears to be reform-overload,  as policy makers have been overwhelmed  by the
number and scope of policy issues the transition  has thrown up.  Equally important is the
need in all countries for financial  system reform.  Although  a private financial  sector is
growing, the vast majority of financial  assets and liabilities  are still held in publicly-owned
banks.  Most of these banks are in need of restructuring, and are suffering from solvency
problems owing to a deteriorating  portfolio of loans to public enterprises (Caprio and Levine,
1994).  Few mutual funds or other forms of institutional  investment  currently exist.  This
leads to questions of the sequencing  of reforms, and whether an explicit strategy of capital
market deepening  is wise or feasible  in the short-to medium  term in EECA.  Questions have
also been raised regarding the feasibility  of developing  such a system in the short to medium
run, given the shortage of financial  skldls  in EECA countries (especially  in regulatory
agencies) (World Bank, 1992).
Offsetting  these concerns regarding timing and sequencing  of reforms is the large
demand for long term savings vehicles  and earnings-related  retirement insurance.
Governments  are unliklly to be successful  in scaling back the obligations  of the public
system without offering alternatives  for additional  old-age security, especially  for middle
income workers.  Experience  in OECD and middle income countries suggests that if
governments  are not pro-active  in organizng the second pillar, a hodge-podge  of
occupational  and employment-based  systems will arise.  This would be particularly
problematic in EECA countries, (if not downright  detrimental to the transition)  for the
following  reasons.
*  Impediment  to enterprise  restructuring. The development  of an employer-based
system, by creating a new set of long term liabilities  for the firm, could seriously
impede enterprise restructuring, and jeopardize fiscal balance if the Treasury were
required to bail out failing state enterprise pension schemes.
*  Reduction in labor mobility.  Failure to insure full portability from day one (rare
in occupational  plans) would also jeopardize labor market mobility (especially
from the public to the private sector).  Efficient labor market adjustment is critical
to an effective transition.
*  Inadequate  and inequitable  coverage.  Fragmented  coverage tends to exclude
people in low paid jobs, small businesses  and agriculture, benefitting primarily the
higher income groups.  Excluded groups can be expected to pdt more pressure on
the public pillar, as this will be their only source of income. They will also be
disadvantaged  relative to included  groups as they will not have access to the high
rates of return with diversified risk that institutional  investment  provides.  This
could contribute to increasing income inequality.-25.
For these reasons, we recommend  that government move quickly to develop a fully-
funded, privately managed, mandatory  savings pillar, following  the model which has been in
place in Chile for 12 years, and is now being adopted in Mexico and Argentina. Note that
unlike Chile, retention of the public, PAYG system is recommended,  in lieu of a the
guaranteed minimum  pension  provided in Chile.  Below, we review the key design features
for EECA countries.
Preconditions.  As funded pension plans  must have some investment vehicles,  a
minimal set of financial  sector, macroeconomic,  and overall structural reforms is desirable
before the second pillar can begin to operate in the domestic market.  Most of these
preconditions  already exist in other middle income countries; their absence at the beginning
of the transition process in EECA has been one of the defining features of this set of
countries (Caprio and Levine, 1994).  These reforms include:
*  a legislative  framework  providing clear and enforceable  private property rights;
- introduction  of modern  accounting  and auditing standards (to facilitate  oversight);
*  a set of prudential regulations  for financial  institutions  and markets;
3  initiation of training in modern financial skills;
*  adoption  of significant  price and trade liberalization  policies so that relative price
signals not too far from world prices are guiding resource allocation (if not, pension
funds will make a bad investments,  complicating  the restructuring  process);
*  progress toward macroeconomic  stability, such that high and variable inflation is not a
threat;
*  tradeable financial  market instruments;  and
*  initial steps toward development  of tax administration  capability.
Some countries have achieved  or nearly achieved these preconditions, inclue4ng
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.  These countries should  be able to begin the
second pillar as soon as the regulation  is in place.  In other countries, several of these
preconditions  do not exist, but are likely to be met over the next 3-5 years.  These countries
can begin system planning and design, and could consider initiating  a system now mdth
extremely limited investment  optior, (e.g. only international  and domestic  government
bonds, or equity investments  linked to foreign direct investment). Investment  rules could be
relaxed as the transition proceeds.  In almost all countries, some  planning can and should
take place during the earliest stages of the reform, even if  implementation  is not envisaged
for a number of years.  Note that fuil financial sector restructuring  is not necessary.  Chile
suffered a financial  crisis and began bank restructuring  two years after the creation of the- 26 -
mandatory  private pension system.  Indeed, it is believed that the new pension  companies
were an important  pressure group insisting on tight prudential regulation in the aftermath of
the financial crisis of 1982 (Diamond  and Valdes-Prieto, 1993).
Scope of program. We recommend  that EECA countries begin the second pillar
modestly.  As in other countries where a well-developed  public scheme already exists, in
most cases it is neither feasible nor desirable to immediately  require large additional
allocations from take-home  pay for a funded-pension  scheme. In EECA, three strong
reasons for starting small are:
a.  even if public systems have been reformed and payroll taxes are lowered, these
rates are still very high.  Adding a mandatory  contribution  to a funded system too
these high levels risks increased evasion throughout  the revenue system, even
though the strong contribution-benefit  link lowers the distortionary  effect of this
tax;
b.  appropriate investment  opportunities  in the initial years may be low; and
c.  lacking experience, the pension funds and the regulatory authorities  are bound to
make mist Jkes  at first.  Better that these mistakes  be small than large.
In this situation, an initial contribution  rate of 3-5 percent of payroll would be enough to start
the program.  In the average EECA country, wages in the covered sector are about 20-30
percent of GDP.  A five percent contribution  rate would produce assets equal to about 1-1.5
percent of GDP in the first year, a savings easily intermediated  by the new system.  As real
wages rise and expenditures  in the public system are reduced, the contribution  rate for the
second pillar could be raised to around 10 percent.
Using  privatizable assets.  With such low contribution  rates, the funded pillar will
not offer much income security to those due to retire over the next ten years.  One way to
accelerate the development  of the funded pillar and provide a more diverse old-age security
system faster would be to transfer some of the assets owned by the state, slated for
privatization, to the second pillar accounts  of the active generation in the form of shares of
stock in these firms.  This approach would also have the advantage of "paying  off'  some of
the accumulated  debt, thus easing the way for a major reduction in public sector entitlements.
(See Box 4)* 27 -
Box 4:  Can public assets  to be privatized be used to start funded pension schemes?
For countries seeking  to make the transition  from a PAYG scheme to a funded  one, the main
obstacle  is usually  how to fund the existing  pension obligations.  While the size of outstanding  debt is
difficult to evaluate,  in EECA countries with  a mature scheme  its present  value given existing  entitlements
has been estimated  at about 1.5 to 2 times GDP (Holzmann,  1993). Only Chile (under  a dictatorship)  has
been able to extract the resources  from the private sector to pay off the total obligation  to existing  pensioners
while at the same time mandating  the contributions  needed to fund the new scheme.
In EECA countries,  however,  assets valued at around  2.5 times GDP are already in public hands.
Why not transfer  these assets to pension funds to pay off existing  obligations,  thus creating the basis for a
new, funded system? Although  quite tantalizing,  this idea thus far has proved infeasible  for the following
reasons.
How many assets are there really available? At least twenty percent of these assets are public
infrastructure,  which will not be privatized. Another  thirty to forty percent is housing  and agricultural  land,
which has, in most countries  outside the FSU already been given away.  Political  pressures  resulted  in
housing  and agricultural  land being transferred  either to the former owners  for free under restitution
schemes,  or to the existing  tenants at grant prices (historical  prices or through  loans with negative real
interest rates or both). There are no signs that treasuries  will receive more resources  from the privatization
of these assets in the FSU.  Another twenty  percent (roughly)  is commercial  real estate, which in most
countries  was already in the hands of the municipalides,  so is not available  to the federal  government. This
leaves  the state enterprise  sector, roughly  twenty to thirty percent of the existing assets, available  for this
purpose,  or about one-half  to three-fourths  of GDP.  This is not enough to pay the whole debt (although  it
could fund part of the debt, such as the debt to existing  workers).
What  are these assets really worth  today and who will buy them? EECA  countries hoping  to raise
revenue from the sale of privatizable  assets have been sorely disappointed. First of all, overstaffed,  poorly
managed,  under capitalized,  indebted  state enterprises  are not easy to sell under any circumstances. Most
countries have not wished  to transfer large chunks  of the state enterprise  sector into foreign hands.
However,  the domestic  private sector has little cash with which to buy these assets, and a weak domestic
banking sector is in no position  to provide  the necessary  liquidity.  This liquidity constraint  implies that were
the state to sell the assets over a reasonable  period to domestic  investors  (e.g. 3-5 years), it would amount  to
a give-away  to those few who have cash or access to credit. As most of these are the beneficiaries  of the
former system, this has also proved  politically  unsustainable.  As a result, most countries have concluded
that the political  consequences  of selling these assets would  outweigh  the revenue  benefits,  and have chosen
to simply give the assets away on a per capita basis in the form of equities (vouchers),  or encourage
employee  buyouts/takeovers,  or both.
Why not Dut the vouchers  into pension funds for those over the age of 18? If all of the vouchers
went into pension funds, these funds would have an initial  portfolio  of 100  percent equities,  a ratio
considered  much too high for a private  pension fund in most OECD countries  (the average in these countries
is closer to one-third). Moreover,  the average  quality  of these  equities is much lower and volatility  much
higher than would be found in most OECD  private pension  funds. As the equities  are not likely to pay a
high dividend  nor be very liquid for the first ten years, transfers  would  still be needed from the state to pay
existing  pensions  and those which  come due in the medium term.
(continued)- 28 -
Would enterprise  nerformance  improve  s 'fficiently  if the equities were Placed in Dension  funds? A
second  reason why voucher schemes  have proved  popular  has been the need to quickly improve  industrial
governance,  in order to insure that the necessary  restructuring  takes  place.  EECA  governments  have proved
unable to change from socialist  owners, with redistribution  objectives,  to pseudo-capitalist  owners, with
profit making  objectives  in such a short time. Thus EECA counties leading the transition  have felt that the
only way to enforce the "hard budget constraint"  on enterprises  is to get real, private  owners,  actively
managing  the portfolio, and working  with companies  to restructure  or liquidate. Based on the experience  in
OECD  countries,  EECA countries  have been skeptical  that pension funds under state sponsorship,  or with a
state guarantee  could provide  the furm  hand necessary  to enforce  the needed changes in a short time period.
Clearly,  very independent  funds would be needed if the proper  corporate  govemance  is to be exercised.  The
higher the share of these state-enterprise  equities in the portfolio  of these funds, the smaller the number  of
funds, and the less independent  the funds are, the greater the danger  that they will perpetuate  the status quo
rather than take the risks necessary  to push the restructuring  forward.
Who will  manage  and  who wil regulate these funds? One of the major problems  facing  EECA
countries as they seek to create a market  economy is the shortage  of people with financial  skills. Although
the workforce  is highly educated  compared  with other countries  at this income level, this education  has been
highly skewed  toward  science, math, and engineering,  as the emphasis  in education  during the centrally-
planned  period was on supplying  human capital for the industrial  sector. Banks were not independent,  but
basically  arms of the treasury. As a result, financial  skills are in short supply, and most are being bought  up
by the growing  private sector. In order to do their job, pension fund regulators  normally  rely on another  set
of regulators  who rate the investments  of pension fund managers -- bank regulators,  bond market  regulators,
stock market regulators,  real estate market  regulators,  etc.  This first tier of regulation  is only now being
created in most EECA  countries, which  complicates  the task of regulating  secondary  investors  such as
pension funds. If furIs  are built up slowly, the regulatory  capability  might be able to catch up.  But if
funds with assets  of 50 percent of GDP (i.e. larger  as a share of GDP than total private  pension funds in the
U.S., Canada or Sweden,  and just under the U.K.) grow up overnight,  the regulatory  challenge  will be
immense.
While it does not appear feasible  to convert the total unfunded  public  pension oblieation into fully
funded  ones with the proceeds  from the sale of state enterprises,  a more modest approach  may be possible.
For example,  the active generation  could be required  to contribute  a portion  of their vouchers  to accounts  in
privately-managed  pension  funds (e.g. a mandatory  savings scheme). Alteratively,  a payroll contribution-
based fund could gradually  buy up some of the vouchers,  helping  to improve  this markeL In this way,
pension fund managers  could become "active  investors"  in a few  companies.  Pension  fund managers
seeking to retain a passive role could also invest in voucher  mutual funds. This would allow the pension
funds to play a role in the privatization  process without  being the main owner of the industrial  sector in the
short run.
Under the right circumstances, this approach appears to have some merit.  It is
important that the amount transferred be small, so as not to overwhelm the other, less volatile
investments of the fund (e.g. bonds).  If not, an unmanageable risk could be introduced,
causing the whole system to fail.  A major difficulty will be the allocation of shares in
enterprises among the funds if there are a number of funds organized.'4 It would be unfair
14  This problem  is well known in EECA,  as it bedevils  any privatization  scheme  which bundles assets into
groups for distribution  in the form of shares  or vouchers.- 29 -
be unfair to the future pensioners  if one fund received assets which turned out to be worth
much more than another.  Yet asset valuation  is very difficult in EECA countries today.
Finally, if this route is chosen, it will be especially  important to insure that fund managers
have full autonomy to manage  their investments  and clear incentive to do so.  This implies
that they cannot come under pressure from governments  or unions not to restructure or
liquidate the enterprises -- they need to have full independence  from the state in the
management  of their assets.  Strategic or otherwise sensitive  sectors or firms therefore should
not be privatized in this manner.
Coverage:  wlunary or mandatoy?  The standard  arguments  for mandatory
insurance  coveage  (myopia, better risk pooling) should apply in most EECA countries."
EspeciaUy  important is the fact that EECA countries  cannot afford the tax expenditures  which
usually accompany  voluntary systems to insure broad participation. An optional  voluntary
contribution  to a mandatory second pilar program would be a desirable feature, however, as
these schemes will probably be the only long-term financial savings vehicle  available for
some time.  Participants  could even be invited to make voluntary contributions  to pension
funds in the form of tradeable privatized assets (vouchers or shares).  This voluntary
contribution  should not be tax favored given current revenue shortfalls (except possibly with
respect to deferred payment of taxes on interest income).
Beneflt  strucnure.  Several  options  for benefits  receipt  were reviewed  in Chapter  5,
including a lump sum, in phased withdrawals,  or required purchase of an annuity. Each
country will want to make its own choice.  A key element will be how quickly the private
insurance market develops. In most countries, the insurance  industry is underdeveloped.
This implies !hat in the initial years, insurance  companies  might charge high risk premiums
or have high overhead costs.  As a result, phased withdrawals  appear more promising than
the required purchase of an annuity.
Investment allocation. Regulations  specifying  allowable  investments  may be the most
difficult aspect of the policy framework. In EECA countries, the risk associated  with classes
of assets is particularly difficult to measure. The policy framework should not be too rigid,
allowing for regular review and modification  as the capital market develops (e.g. investment
allocation rules should not be written into legislation, but set by executive  decree).  For
safety and liquidity, and as a hedge against domestic  inflation, a portion (e.g. 30-40 percent)
should be invested in indexed government  bonds.  A second hedge against domestic
inflation would be provided by requiring at least 15 percent of capital invested in foreign
bonds.  Foreign investment will be controversial  given strong demand for foreign exchange
and stiff exchange controls on capital transactions  in most transition economies. However,
this may be the most important  feature in establishing  fund credibility  and risk
diversification,  and so it should be pursued vigorously. The rest of the capital may be
invested in equity in private companies,  real estate, shares of public holding companies,
private bonds as these emerge, etc.  Regulations  covering these investments  should specify
'I  Sec James, 1992 for a discussion  of these arguments.- 30 -
the receiving firm's reporting requirements, auditing  practices, and other such regulations  to
insure transparency.
Expertise. One of the major obstacles  to the formation of institutional  investors  in
EECA is shortage of expertise. The best way for EECA countries to gain this expertise
quickly is to encourage foreign-domestic  partnerships  at the beginning. As nationals gain the
necessary  expertise, foreign partners can be bought out.
Organuzation  and regulatory  structure.  Centralized state management  is clearly not
consistent  with the transition path most EECA countries are following, and is not likely to be
credible given the experience with the public system (which in most countries started out
funded and became PAYG as reserves built up and were used by government  for current
expenditures). On the other hand, EECA countries will want to avoid the high overhead
costs of a highly decentralized,  individual  system.  Smaller countries may find that
economies  of scale in administration  do not permit more than one or two funds, however,
and so may be forced into a more centralized  route.  These funds could simply  be branches
of larger investment  companies  from OECD countries.  Development  of a number of private
funds or the creation of a set of funds vith regional monopolies may be appropriate  in larger
countries.  Larger pension funds are particular desirable given the role these funds need to
play in improving corporate governance  as 'active investors'  (or investors in other funds
run by active investors).
EECA countries are in the process of developing new regulatory agencies  for financial
intermediaries. Given the shortage of financial  skills and the high demand for these skills in
the private sector, staffing these new agencies has been a problem.  The human  capital
constraint has been much stronger when supervisory  roles are given to departments  already
staffed by bureaucrats from the days of central planning (e.g. departments  of the Ministry of
Finance, for example).  Not only are these staff difficult to train, but the existing government
bureaucrats are not usually as performance-oriented  as would be needed.  Creation of a new,
independent  agency to regulate pension funds, staffed by non-civil servants on more flexible
contracts deserves serious consideration.
Effects of Reform Program
The primary motivation  for pension  reform in EECA countries is the fiscal crisis.
Will the set of reforms to the public pillar recommended  resolve the fiscal problems?
Developing  the economic scenarios  to answer this question is extremely complex, as it
requires a number of assumptions  about economic  growth, the evolution of wages and labor
productivity, and behavioral responses.  However, based on several quantitative  analyses, the
following  results emerge.
*  Raising  retirement ages can be expected to generate significant  expenditure savings
over the next 10-15 years.  Simulations  for the FSU show that raising the normal
retirement age by six months a year for 10 years is projected to yield an expenditure- 31 -
savings of about 30 percent by 2003 (assuming  the average pension remains the
same). (Cavalcanti, 1993).  In Poland, cutting back early retirement by 50 percent
could save roughly 3 percent of GDP annually by 2010 (Rashid, 1993). In Romania,
equalizing  normal retirement ages for men and women to 65 and for most early
retirees to 60 by the year 2000 reduces the projected system dependency ratio by 25
percent at the millenrium (Romaiuan  government  projections).
*  Lowering average benefits also generates  expenditure  savings, but not as dramatic  in
the  m  uJnM.  In Poland, simulations  lowering regular benefits by 20 percent
generated only half the savings of the eligibility-delaying  reforms by the year 2003
(Rashid,  1993).  This is because the system is maturing. Without reform, the post-
war baby boom generation will begin to reach retirement age during the next ten
years.
Thus, of all the reforms of the public system mentioned  above, the highest priority should  be
given to raising retirement ages.  This is clearly a questioa of political feasibility  as in
Bulgaria, a 1986 survey found that over 50 percent of all pensioners rated themselves  as able
to work (Petkov and Minev, 1989).
The recommended  reforms in the public sector are less feasible without the
development  of additional  pillars.  This is one of the most important reasons for moving
ahead in this area.  The second pillar will have other benefits as well which are not fiscal,
but political or psychological. As Johnson, (1993) points out, creation of this pillar would be
the strongest possible signal the government  could send that individuals  are now responsible
for their own well-being. It would also create a constituency  in favor of macroeconomic
stability  and financial  sector reform.  To the extent that in the absence of a second pillar the
profits from privatization  and enterprise restructuring  are more likely to go to wealthier
inivestors  -- who are better able to diversify their portfolio, handle risk, and take a long term
perspective -- creating institutional  investors with broad participation  among the active
generation may increase the political acceptability  of the privatization  and restructuring
process.  Pension fund assets could also help to stimulate foreign direct investment (FDI), as
they could complement  FDI in new ventures. The presence of domestic pension fund assets
in an  1DI  deal would help to reassure foreign investors with respect to the political climate.
Sequencing and Obstacles to Reform
Most EECA countries recognize that their public pension systems are in need of a
major reform.  Indeed, reform of long-term benefit entitlements  has been a condition of Bank
adjustment  loans in most countries.  Since 1989, some reform has taken place.  (See Box 5).
For example, Hungary has attempted to improve transparency  by separating  benefits into
separate funds (e.g. long term benefits, short-term benefits, health care expenditures). The
FSU created an independent  pension and farnily  allowance fund, fully financed  by earmarked
contributions,  just prior to the break-up.  Since the break-up, Estonia has introduced  flat
pensions.  Bulgaria has reduced the scope of early retirement for future pensioners, and both*  32 -
Bulgaria and Romania  have increased the tax rate for employees  who receive early retirement
(although not the level which would be required for actuarial fairness).  Albania has
introduced  a far-reaching  reform, including  the introduction  of employee contributions  and a
modified flat benefit structure.  Many countries have now introduced  indexation  provisions at
least for the minimum  pension.
Box 5:  Trasuidon Economies  - Public Penion  Reorms  since 1989
Eastrmopo
Poland  Social  Insure  Act of 1991  introduced  new benefit fornmul  which abolished
diffeen  in beefit  levels according to occupation, gradually  increased  the
number of working  yea  used to calculte erings  base and lowered the
maximum  penin  Quartrly indexation  of pensions  to averae  wage was also
introduced.
Romamia  1992  reform. introduced  higher contribution  rates for those employed in
occupations  subject to eady retirement  progrms,  and increased  benefits from the
fwuded  scheme. The multiple  pension schomes  are gradually  unifying.
Bulgaria  In 1991, contributions  wero increased  for employees  in oligible  for early
retiremont. Pension  Reform Act of 1992  raised minimum  retiremt  age for early
retirees, reduced  number of workes  eligible  for these  benefits,  and added
incentives  for those above retirement  age to keep working.
Hungary  1992 reforms included:  introduction  of ceiling on contributions,  increase  in
minimum  coatribution  years necessary,  minor changes in benefit formulae,
indexation  of pensions, and creation of independent  social  insurance fund, with
separation  of contributions  according to use.  The provision  in the 1992 legislation
which  would  have gradually  raised the standard  retirement  age for womon to that
of men wa  suspended.
Albania  1992 reform created an independent  social insuraneC  agency with an indenn
financing  and budget; the pension fund was separated  in 1993.  Also in 1993,
major reform logislation  was passed  and implemented,  including:  a grdual
increase in the minimum  contribution  period for a full pension;  ceiling on pension
and contributions;  employee  contributions,  and a flat contribution  for the self-
employed. Benefits  were also restructured,  and are now based on years of
contribution. Annual indexation  of pensions  was also introduced.
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Former Soviet  Union
Ukraine  edet  fund (with eamrked  funding and separto  budget)  established  in 1991.
Contribution  rte  nied in 1st quarter 1992 but then lowered back.
Russia  fund establishe Much  1991.  Maximum  pension lowered but then  aised to
previous level in October 1992.  Optional  annuity scheme  crted  in 1987.
Kyrghyzaan  Ind  pension fund created in 1991, based on Soviet model. A retirement  test was
eliminated  in 1991.
Belas  t pension  fund created in 1991, based on Soviet model.
Estonia  n  t  pension  law passed  in April 1991. Flat pension paid since  Febnruay  1992.
Georgia  In  fund ceted  in 1990, on Soviet model, with addition  of eamiings  test.
Kazkhstan  pension  fund created 1991.
LAtvin  peaion  fund establishd in 1991.
Lithuanis  Te  proe-990 Soviet  schemo  was still in operaion in 1992  although  social  pensions  were
introduced.
Uzbekistan  Still operting on the basis of the existing Soviet Pensions  Law from 1990.
However,  system-wide  reform,  addressing  comprehensively  the  issues  listed  above,
has  been  elusive  thus  far,  despite  widespread  agreement  among  policy  makers  that  the
current  programs  are  neither  adequate  nor  appropriate.  Why  have  efforts  at  comprehensive
reform  stalled?
The weaknaesses  of the system  are  poorly understood  by most  of the voters. PAYG
system  are  inherently  non-transparent,  which  is  why  reform  is  so  difficult.  Until  a  crisis
occurs,  most  pensioners  imagine  that  their  contributions  have  been  placo-d  somewhere  safe,
that  their  entitlement  is  actuarially  fair,  an(i  therefore  that  they  are  entitled  to  their  benefits.
After  years  of  central  planning,  most  of  the  active  and  retired  populations  are  used  to
thinking  of  income  as  an  obligation  of  the  state  and  are  unaware  of  the  issues  identified
above.
More  importantly,  there  is  not  yet  a  constituency  for  reform.  The  active  population
has  not  focuissed  on  the  cost  to  them  of  this  system,  as  the  contributions  are  paid  by  the  firm.
Even  among  policy  makers,  the  depth  of  the  problems  are  poorly  understood.  The  extent  to
which  EECA  systems  are  at  variance  with  both  Western  European  system  xn  the  systems  of
countries  at  their  income  level  is  not  well  known.  Yet  the  differences  are  stark,  as  we  have
seen  above.  And,  even  in  the  high  income  welfare  states,  public  PAYG  systems  are  facing
pension  financing  crises.- 34 -
Personal economic uncertainty is extremely  high.  Structure  and rigidity were two of
the key features of centrally  planned economies.  Jobs, stable prices, access to services
(albeit mediocre  ones), and a pension were all guaranteed. Household income distribution
was relatively flat -- all but the party elite were equally poor, and even the elite were not
ostentatiously  rich.  (Atkinson  and Micklewright, 1993).  The transition is changing  all of
this.  Inflation, unemployment  and inequality  have all arrived.  The rules of the economic
game change every day as activities are decontrolled  or decentralized. Privatization  and
restitution  are redistributing  assets, but few markets exist so that their value can be
ascertained  or monitored.  Opportunities  to gain or lose money quickly abound, creating a
climate of fear and suspicion. Changing the rules of the game with respect to pensions is not
welcome, so long as people mistakenly  believe that the old rules can be maintained.
Fiscal systems are collapsing. Changing  to a market economy has implied major
changes in the tax system, shifting from an emphasis  on taxing functional  income at the
enterprise to taxing personal income and consumption. Few EECA countries are managing
this fiscal transi;ion well.  In the face of shrinking  tax revenues form other sources, countries
are depending  on payroll tax collections, no matter what the efficiency  and equity issues are.
This is espe-tially  true in countries where the system is running a surplus.  There is no
interest on .he part of finance ministries in a reform of the financing side until coilections
from other taxes improve.
Short-run  perspective.  Politicians  are famous for having a short-run time horizon,
with a resistance to tackling difficult issues which only have a short run political cost but a
long run payoff.  For this reason, comprehensive  social insurance  reform is difficult in all
countries.  This problem is even worse in EECA countries.  Three years of intense economic
decline has political and economic  leaders desperate to restart growth.  High inflation (caused
in part by the shock of lifting price controls) and a highly uncertain future have added to the
incentives  to postpone reform in this area, despite the urgency of the issue.
Political  cost.  Adding to the innate reluctance  of politicians to address this issue is
the political cost of admitting  to the population  that the promises of past governments  can not
be met.  Even if many voters suspect this, they rarely reward the messenger.
Little experience in market economy  and the management  of change.  Political
institutions  are young, and in many countries quite volatile. Parliaments  are still finding their
way, and setting the rules of the game.  Most technocrats have little experience in the market
economy, and therefore have trouble anticipating  events or developing  implementation  plans
for reforms which are much less controversial. Civil servants and centralized  bureaucracies
are inexperienced  in introducing and managing  change, and do not have the skills (or,
sometimes, the interest) in implementing  the legislation  already adopted. Governments  are
unused to their responsibilities  to communicate  with the population  in a democracy. As a
result, change in EECA countries has come much slower than originally anticipated. The
transition time is now being measured in decades rather than the months or years discussed
during the euphoria of 1990.- 3S -
Failure to consider the system as a whole. Most reform efforts have concentrated  on
the public system, without considering the long term need for a multi-pillar system, and the
role of the public pillar within this system.  Thus, financial  system development  is being
considered in one part of the government (usually  the central bank) while reform of the
social insurance system is being considered in another (usually a ministry of labor and social
insurance, although  independent  social insurance agencies  are becoming more common).
The government  agencies are not predisposed to consider a reduced role for themselves, as
they are used to a model where the public redistributive  pillar provides all.  The financial
authorities  are overwhelmed  by the short-term problems  of developing  a sound banking
system. Neither agency is to talking to the other (nor were they in the habit of doing so in
the past).
What kdnd  of reform program could overcome these obstacles? As in other countries,
a well-designed,  coordinated, patient approach shows the highest likelihood  of success. The
process must begin with a public education  and consensus  building effort, so that the
parameters of the problem are better understood. The unfairness  of the current system must
be documented,  and the costs made more transparent  to the active population through reform
of the taxation system.  The proposed reform should  be comprehensive  and credible, clearly
meeting the redistribution, savings, and insurance needs of all age groups.  Government
agencies  and departments  must begin to work together on this issue.  One possible  phasing
for higher income countries might be:
*  Year 1:  enact contribution  reform to set the stage for further reform; prepare
technical  analysis of reform options including  actuarial analysis of the public pillar
and fnancial analysis of funded options; explain analysis and need for reforms to
the population; begin creating macroeconomic  and financial pre-conditions  for
second pillar.
*  Year 2: complete and enact legislation  providing for a phased reform of public
sector program, including raising retirement  age, eliminating special categories,
flattening  out benefits; introduce administrative  reforms, establish timetable  for
reform of public pillar financing  options consistent with overall fiscal reform (e.g.
probably at the time of introduction  of PIT).
*  Year  3:  complete  and introduce legislation  to create the second pillar including
schedule  to assign some payroll taxes from the public PAYG pillar to the funded
pillar.
Slower-reforming  countries will probably wish to delay introduction  of the second pillar.
Reform of the financing system in the public pillar may also be delayed if the tax reform has
not yet started.
One approach to sweeten the reduction in benefits from the public system might be to
give the' active generation  a choice of:- ;6 -
(a) joining  the nw system - reduced contributions  to the public system combined
with reduced benefits, with the difference  between the old and new contributions
assigned to the mandatory  savings system; or
(b) staying with the old system - same level of contribution  to the public system,
higher flat or modified flat benefit than group (a).
Option (b) might be perceived as a less risky option for older workers with fewer years of
contribution  left.- 37 -
Conclusion
EECA pension systems present a paradox.  Pensions are low, yet expenditures  are
high, given the level of GDP.  Part of the explanation  for this paradox is the demographic
structure, which is usually seen only in richer counties.  But the main explanation  is the veiy
low age of retirement, which results in a low contribution  period and a high system
dependency  ratio.  It is this paradox of low penisions  and high expenditure  which makes
reform so difficult in EECA, as in these countries, too many people have already retired.
Especially during the transition, these generations  need a safety net, regardless of whether
they deserve one on the basis of age alone.  They have few opportunities  to acquire wealth
today.  Some intergenerational  redistribution  is necessary. The recommendations  are
designed to improve the equity and efficiency  of the public pension system as a safety net for
this group, in an affordable manner.
While a number of the initial difficulties  of the transition  in EECA countries were
foreseen as the Berlin Wall fell, the extent of the crisis in pension systems was not.  This is
especially true in the countries themselves  (Hungary  being a notable exception). Indeed,
some countries  expanded entitlements  as a way of inducing  labor market adjustment. As the
depth of the problem became clear, EECA countries have attempted to formulate  reform
programs.  Albania, one of the poorest in EECA, is the only country to have passed through
their legislature a major reduction in entitlements,  however. The pension issue has proved to
be one of the most contentious  of all in EECA, even more contentious  than privatization.
We conclude that one of the reasons why reform has failed in EECA countries is
because governments  have tried to reduce the scope of the public pillar without providing  an
alternative  to assure old-age security. Failure to begin development  of other pillars which
would meet the active generation's needs for old-age income security based on savings and
insurance principles may have doomed reform efforts from the start.- 38 -
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Hungary  59  36  38  60  55 Poland  49  28  43  65  60 Romania  62  30  52  60  55 Czechoslovakia  ....  32  ....  60  55 Bulgaria  87  37  57  60  55 Albania  37  17  54  60  55 Slovenia  54  29  46  60  55
Former  Soviet Union
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Notes:
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* *  Ratio of pensioners to contributors.
Source: World Bank Staff EstimatesTable 2:  Financial Characteristics of Public Pension  Schemes in Transition Economies, 1992
(percent)
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